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The Oxford handbook of public choice

editado por Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt.

2 volúmenes ; 26 cm.

ISBN: 9780190469733, 9780190469771, ,

Resumen: "Esta colección de dos volúmenes proporciona una descripción completa de los últimos setenta años de investigación de elección pública, escrita por expertos en los campos encuestados... La mayoría están escritos para estudiantes de pregrado y posgrado de nivel superior en economía y ciencias políticas, otros son completamente accesibles para lectores no expertos que estén interesados en la investigación de Public Choice. El conjunto de dos volúmenes será de gran interés para científicos sociales, analistas de políticas e historiadores "-

Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice.


  • Volume 1. Rational choice and politics: an introduction to the research program and methodology of public choice / Roger D. Congleton
  • Choosing among governments / Alan Hamlin
  • Public choice: early contributions / Dennis C. Mueller
  • From paired comparisons and cycles to arrow's theorem / Donald G. Saari
  • Institution-induced stability / Kenneth A. Shepsle
  • Voting power / Stefan Napel
  • Aggregation of information by binary voting rules / Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush
  • Political choices in one dimension: theory / Bernard Grofman
  • Political choices in one dimension: applications / Bernard Grofman
  • Spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions / James F. Adams
  • Spatial social choice / Norman Schofield
  • Economic voting / Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier
  • Valence politics / Haldun Evrenk
  • The study of strategic voting / André Blais and Arianna Degan
  • Turnout: why do voters vote? / Serguei Kaniovski
  • Expressive voting / Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings
  • Altruism and political participation / Richard Jankowski
  • Social embeddedness and rational turnout / Carole Jean Uhlaner
  • Information cues and rational ignorance / Shaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson
  • Manipulation / Charles R. Plott
  • Campaign finance / Thomas Stratmann
  • Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: how do they matter? / Gilles Serra
  • Logrolling and coalitions / Anthony J. McGann
  • Collective action / Jac C. Heckelman
  • Rent seeking: the social cost of contestable benefits / Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long
  • The structure of contests and the extent of dissipation / Karl Wärneryd
  • The political economy of rent creation and rent extraction / Roger D. Congleton
  • Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs / Ignacio Del Rosal
  • "The bureaucracy" as an interest group / Patrick Dunleavy
  • Interest groups and regulatory capture / William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas
  • Corruption / Toke Aidt
  • The political economy of trust / Christian Bjørnskov
  • Contested political persuasion / Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya
  • Stochastic process models of preference change / Michel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu
  • Leadership as persuasion / Benjamin E. Hermalin
  • Fairness concepts / Christian Klamler
  • Social contract vs. invisible hand: agreeing to solve social dilemmas / Viktor J. Vanberg
  • Utilitarianism as a criterion for state action / Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann
  • Public choice and happiness / Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer
  • Kantianism and political institutions / Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
  • Public choice and libertarianism / Peter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano
  • Public choice and social democracy / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
  • Supreme values, totalitarianism and terrorism / Peter Bernholz
  • Fair division in dispute resolution / Steven J. Brams
  • Fair division in allocating cabinet ministries / Steven J. Brams.
  • Volume 2. How should votes be cast and counted? / Nicolaus Tideman
  • Voters and representatives: how should representatives be selected? / Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer
  • Divided government: the king and the council / George Tridimas
  • Bicameralism / Cecilia Testa
  • Federalism / Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
  • Executive veto power and constitutional design / Nicholas R. Miller
  • Politics and the legal system / Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal
  • Constitutional review / Nuno Garoupa
  • Institutions for amending constitutions / Cristina Bucur and Bjørn Erik Rasch
  • Constitutional transition / Zachary Elkins
  • Electoral systems in the making / Daniel Bochsler
  • Choosing voting rules in the European Union / Bela Plechanovová, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov
  • Leviathan, taxation, and public goods / Martin C. McGuire
  • Fiscal powers revisited: the leviathan model after 40 years / Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
  • Are there types of dictatorship? / Ronald Wintrobe
  • Are there really dictatorships? the selectorate and authoritarian governance / Alejandro Quiroz Flores
  • The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes / Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon
  • The logic of revolutions: rational choice perspectives / Timur Kuran and Diego Romero
  • Direct democracy and public policy / John G. Matsusaka
  • Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems / Sebastian M. Saiegh
  • The significance of political parties / Michael Munger
  • The least dangerous branch? public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance / Georg Vanberg
  • Challenges in estimating the effects of constitutional design on public policy / Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann
  • The political economy of taxation: power, structure, redistribution / Stanley L. Winer
  • The politics of central bank independence / Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
  • The political economy of redistribution policy / Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung
  • Political participation and the welfare / Rainald Borck
  • Institutions for solving commons problems: lessons and implications for institutional design / Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox
  • Rational ignorance and public choice / Ilya Somin
  • Is government growth inevitable? / Randall G. Holcombe
  • The political economy of international organizations / Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang
  • The politics of international trade / Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman
  • Politics, direct investment, public debt markets and the shadow economy: what do we (not) know? / Friedrich Schneider
  • The politics of international aid / Hristos Doucouliagos
  • Is democracy exportable? / Pierre Salmon
  • Ancient Greece: democracy and autocracy / Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen
  • Christian history and public choice / Mario Ferrero
  • Voting at the u.s. constitutional convention / Keith L. Dougherty
  • Precursors to public choice / Iain McLean
  • Estimates of the spatial voting model / Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole
  • The dimensionality of parliamentary voting / Keith T. Poole
  • Voting and popularity / Gebhard Kirchgässner
  • Detection of election fraud / Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack
  • Experimental public choice: elections / Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram
  • Experimental evidence on expressive voting / Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner.
Registro eeo003587 · Modificado: 14/09/2020

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