Simple adaptive strategies : from regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics
Sergiu Hart, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, Andreu Mas-Colell, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona ; with the collaboration of Yakov Babichenko, Amotz Cahn, Yishay Mansour, David Schmeidler.
xxxviii, 296 pages ; 25 cm.
Serie: World Scientific series in economic theory, 2251-2071 ; v. 4
ISBN: 9789814390699,
Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice.
Contenido
- Existence of correlated equilibria / Hart, Sergiu - Schmeidler, David, 1939-
- A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- A general class of adaptive strategie / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- A reinforcement procedure leading to correlated equilibrium / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- General procedure leading to correlated equilibria / Cahn, Amotz
- Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to nash equilibrium / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and nash equilibrium / Hart, Sergiu - Mas-Colell, Andreu
- Uncoupled autómata and pure nash equilibria / Babichenko, Yokov
- How long to equilibrum? the communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedure / Hart, Sergiu - Mansour, Yishay
- Adaptive heuristics / Hart, Sergiu
- Nash equilibrium and dynamics / Hart, Sergiu.