The logic of strategy
edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms.
New York : Oxford University Press, 1999.
xi, 195 págs. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0195117158 (acid-free paper)
Incluye referencias bibliográficas.
Contenido
- Knowledge, belief, and counterfacual reasoning in games / Stalnaker, Robert
- Consequentialims, non-archimedean probabilities, and lexicographic expected utility / Hammond, Peter J.
- Solutions based on ratifiability and sure thing reasoning / Harper, William
- Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionals / Fuhrmann, A. (Andre), 1958- - Levi, Isaac
- Aumann´s "no agreement" theorem Generalized / Hild, Matthias - Jeffrey, Richard C. - Risse, Mathias, 1970-
- Rational failures of the KK principle / Williamson, Timothy
- How much common belief is necessary for a convention? / Shin, Hyun Song - Williamson, Timothy
- Sophisticated bounded agents play the repeated dilema / Bacharach, Michael - Shin, Hyun Song - Williams, Mark
- Can free choice be known? / Gilbao, Itzhak
- Symmetry arguments for cooperation in the prisoner´s dilemma / Bicchieri, Cristina - Green, Mitchell S.
